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SC 01348-77
Copy No. 6

4 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[REDACTED]
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: CRITIC Reporting

REFERENCE: PAID Memorandum, SC 01345-76, Dtd 12 August 1976; Subject: Review of Field Reporting on the Disappearance and Deaths of Ambassador Meloy and Embassy Officer Waring (Lebanon)

1. Last August I requested your personal views on the referenced report which deals with intelligence reporting at the time of the Meloy assassination. I appreciate your advice on how we might handle the report and we have revised the report to accord with your suggestions by deleting references to DDO cryptonyms and eliminating sensitive data in the CIA cables.

2. Following your review, we asked [REDACTED] for his informal comments. This took longer than I anticipated and he has only recently replied. However, I wanted to hold off sending you the revised report through formal channels until we had his views. I was pleased to learn that the findings of our report motivated State to make wide field dissemination of the Community-approved Handbook of Standard Operating Procedures for CRITIC reporting as we had urged. I believe this action will help greatly to ensure that in the future the CRITIC system is used and used properly by State Department personnel to report critical information.

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3. I am forwarding the revised report to you formally at this time to support those actions you think appropriate to improve reporting procedures within CIA. Although the Meloy-Waring incident may seem a bit dated now, it still serves well to illustrate the point that we do not yet have among overseas components of the Community a common understanding of and full compliance with the CRITIC reporting procedures established in DCID 7/1. Since the Lebanon report was written, there have been several other incidences in which procedural errors in CRITIC reporting by CIA stations have occurred--indicating that an unfamiliarity with proper CRITIC reporting procedures still exists.

4. I know that you share my concern in this problem, and I trust the recommendations which appear at the end of the attached report will be of help to you in taking whatever remedial actions you think appropriate.

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Attachment:
SC 01345-76, Cy No. 6

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


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